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Abstract— Technological change is shaped by a confluence of 
processes that are governed by socio-political, economic, and 
regulatory factors within a region. In this paper we describe the 
transformation of the electricity generation system in France and 
the emerging changes in the transportation sector in the country. 
We trace the impact of national energy security policy in France 
after the 1973 oil crisis that catalyzed a shift from dependence on 
fossil fuel to nuclear power, and then examine the continuing 
impacts of that legacy that are now emerging through 
development and deployment of electric vehicles in the country. 
We examine the two cases of nuclear power and electric vehicles 
in France using processes of innovation, and discuss the 
interaction of these processes that formed reinforcing loops to 
advance these technologies in the country and highlight the role 
of sustained policy in initiating and driving the reinforcing cycles.  
We also discuss the issue of new emerging linkages between the 
electric power generation and transportation sectors that were 
traditionally decoupled due to use of different fuel sources. We 
expand the notion of path dependence, and discuss how 
established technologies in one sector can shape future 
technological trajectory in other sectors. 
Keywords— innovation processes; nuclear energy; electric 
vehicles ; technological trajectory. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Technological change is shaped by a confluence of 
processes that are governed by socio-political, economic, and 
regulatory factors within a region. An understanding of these 
processes and factors can provide important strategic insights 
that can help inform policy as well as private enterprise. Over 
past decades, researchers have extensively worked on this 
topic, and there is a vast amount of literature on technology 
innovation [1], technological transitions [2], and industrial 
transformation [3]. In recent years, this area has gained 
particular salience for policy makers who want to enable a 
transition to renewble energy and other sustainable 
technologies [4][5]. The question of how to diffuse new 
technologies has been explored [6], and the question of why 
certain technologies remain embedded (or locked-in) despite 
evidence of sub-optimal performance on economic, 
environmental, and safety dimensions has been investigated 
[7].  
A number of frameworks have been proposed for 
understanding and analyzing technological change and 
technology adoption from economic [8], engineering [9], and 
socio-political [10] perspectives. A widely accepted notion, 
based on socio-economic arguments, is that in systems where 
there are increasing returns, chance events and not innate 
technological superiroty of a technology, can determine large-
scale adoption in the long-term. In this paper, we present a 
narrative of technology change in the power generation sector 
in France drawing concepts from the above mentioned 
literature. We discuss how the oil crises of 1973 catalyzed 
strong policy action for energy independence and national 
energy security that led to a transformation from imported 
fossil fuel based electricity generation to nuclear power. We 
systematically analyze the transition by using a discrete set of 
processes proposed by Hekkert et al. [4][5]. We use this set of 
processes, called ‘functions of innovation’, to map how their 
interaction formed reinforcing cycles leading to large-scale 
adoption of nuclear power in the country. We also show how 
these interactions were initiated and sustained through state 
policy. We then apply this approach to the case of electric 
vehicles in France, and discuss existing policy and its 
implication on potential future trajectories of the technology in 
the country. 
II. FUNCTIONS IN TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION SYSTEMS 
Hekkert et al. have discussed technological innovation 
systems (TIS), comprising of actors, technology, institutions, 
and networks, that influence the speed and direction of a 
technological change in a specific technological area [5]. They 
also propose seven functions (or processes) that collectively 
(and in various combinations) either impede or facilitate the 
overall success (i.e. large-scale diffusion) of a technology. The 
functions are: F1. Goal Formulation, F2. Knowledge 
development, F3. Knowledge exchange, F4. Entrepreneurial 
action, F5. Market formation, F6. Resource mobilization and 
F7. Legitimacy creation. In our work, we change the 
terminology for F4, and refer to it as Goal formulation and for 
F2 as Knowledge creation. Furthermore, we also change the 
numbering convention proposed in [5]. Table 1 explains the 
functions that we use in our study. 
TABLE I.  Functions in Innovation Systems (based on [6].) 
System Functions Description 
F1: Goal formulation Announcement of policy goals, or 
expectations that converge to generate a 
specific momentum towards change in a 
particular direction (e.g. the case of 
renewable energy systems).  
F2:Knowledge creation Research and development activities that 
generate new knowledge. Examples include 
R&D projects in public and private sectors. 
F3: Knowledge diffusion Knowledge exchange through conferences, 
workshops, platforms, and publications 
between government, competitors, and 
markets. 
F4:Entrepreneurial action Activities that convert new knowledge into 
concrete action that takes advantage of 
business opportunities. Examples include 
new firms, or development of new projects, 
or production facilities in existing firms etc. 
 
F5: Market formation Creation of a market of the new technology. 
This maybe assisted through policy action 
(using tax-breaks), or with other competitive 
advantage provided by the new technology. 
 
F6: Resource mobilization Human and financial (investments, subsidies) 
resources provided by actors in the system to 
run all the innovation activities.  
F7: Legitimacy creation Creating advocacy coalitions (e.g. lobby of 
actors) to improve technical, institutional, 
and financial conditions for the particular 
technology. This is needed to counteract 
resistance to change so that the new 
technology can become part of an incumbent 
regime or even overthrow it altogether.  
 
These seven processes or functions need to be present in a 
system of technology innovation, and the particular interaction 
and combination of these functions shapes the long-term 
outcome for the new technology. In some cases, these 
functions interact to produce a cycle of growth and expansion 
in which the new technology secures wide adoption. In other 
cases, these functions may interact to create a cycle of 
destruction in which the new innovation is unable to take hold 
and diffuse at a large-scale. 
A systematic mapping of these functions, and their 
particular interactions for a given technology can allow for 
understanding how past technologies were successfully 
established, and also help inform future strategies for deploying 
new technologies. This study is motivated within this context, 
and in this paper we present detailed narratives of nuclear 
energy and electric vehicles in France and map the 
development and deployment of those technologies using the 
seven functions of innovation described above. 
III. POWER GENERATION SYSTEM IN FRANCE 
Our narrative draws from a historical account of the 
development of nuclear power in France as reported in [11]. 
Before 1946, the electricity system in France comprised of a 
large number of private firms that provided production, 
transmission, distribution and other services. The system had 
emerged without any central planning or control, and at the 
start of the Second World War, there were 200 companies 
engaged in production, 100 in transmission, and 1150 in 
distribution in the country. At the end of the war, the law 
makers decided to consolidate the industry to improve 
efficiency and speed up reconstruction efforts. In 1946, the 
national assembly unanimously voted to nationalize both the 
electricity and gas sectors in France. For the electricity sector, 
Electricité de France (EDF) was formed as a state-owned 
company that was charged to build up the electricity generation 
capacity for the country.  
Pierre Simon, the first director general of EDF, and a 
former director of hydroelectric energy at the Ministry of 
Public Works, directed the company to focus on construction 
of hydro-electric systems. In the 1940s and 50s the focus was 
mostly on expansion of hydro-power, and in the period 
between 1949 and 1957 forty eight new hydroelectric facilities 
were brought into service. In 1960, the hydro power plants 
generated 37.1 GWh of electricity that constituted 71.5% of 
EDFs total production at that time. The fossil fuel powered 
systems contributed to the remaining mix with 18% generation 
from coal-fired thermal stations and 3% from oil burning 
stations. 
As demand for electricity continued to grow with 
increasing economic development in the country, other sources 
of energy were soon needed. Starting in the 1960s, a shift 
towards oil burning stations began to occur. At the time, oil 
was a cheap fuel and oil-powered plants offered the flexibility 
of meeting diurnally fluctuating electricity demands. Over the 
next decade the electricity generation mix changed, and by 
1973 oil-fired power stations provided 43% and hydroelectric 
stations 32% of generation capacity in the country. In a 13 year 
period, the share of electricity generated from oil-burning 
power plants increased from 3% to 43% and assumed a critical 
role in energy production in France.  
A. The Era of Nuclear Power 
The French military nuclear weapons program had spawned 
off a civil nuclear project in the 1940s. General de Gaulle 
established the Atomic Energy Commissariat (CEA) in 
October 1945 that continued research on nuclear technology. 
The development of this technology had steadily progressed 
over the years, and by 1957 a small 68 MW nuclear power 
station project in the Loire Valley had been started. This power 
station, using technology developed by the CEA, was 
commissioned in 1962, and was slowly expanded in stages 
over the years. With increasing experience and continued 
technological development (wherein heavy water reactors and 
pressurized water reactors were introduced), nuclear powered 
electric plants had come to form a small niche within the power 
sector and produced 14 GWh or 8% of EDFs total output in 
1973. 
In the 1973 oil crisis, the price of oil quadrupled, and the 
economics of the oil-based energy generation system changed 
dramatically. The nuclear option, previously considered too 
expensive seemed much more attractive. Furthermore, the risks 
of being reliant on imported commodities became prominent. 
A mix of economic as well as public sentiments of national 
independence and self-reliance came together to influence a 
significant shift in the trajectory of energy technology in the 
country. 
In March 1974, the French prime minister, Pierre Messmer, 
made a major speech and outlined the case for nuclear energy 
for the country by pointing out that the country has no oil 
resources, less coal than England and Germany, and much less 
gas than Holland. For France, only the nuclear option could 
provide energy independence. This became known as the 
Messmer plan, and called for creating 13 GW of nuclear power 
plant capacity over the next two years. In 1974, work on three 
nuclear plants was started, and by 1979 nuclear energy 
accounted for 20% of EDF’s total output. This share further 
grew to 49% in 1983 and 75% in 1990. The total capacity in 
1990 of EDF’s nuclear power generation stood at 54 GW and 
was greater than the combined nuclear power capacity of the 
UK, West Germany, Spain, and Sweden. In 2012, the total 
capacity of nuclear power generation in France has reached 63 
GW. The net production of electrical energy coming from 
nuclear plants accounted to 404.9 TWh, representing ~75% of 
total electricity generation (541 TWh) (See Figure 1). 
The large scale of development however, left the country 
with an over-capacity by the mid 1980s, and by 1988 the 
nuclear power plants were running at a load factor of 61% (as 
compared to 92% in Finland or 84% in Switzerland). Thus the 
goal of self-reliance and independence was fulfilled, but to an 
extent that exceeded domestic needs. With the excess capacity, 
EDF explored export opportunities, and within a few years 
France was exporting significant amounts of power to 
neighboring European countries (see Figure 2). 
During the yearly years of nuclear power development, 
some public groups opposed the technology with street protests 
and demonstrations. Such activities of resistance and 
opposition were highly insulated and stifled with police action 
[11]. Over time, the public support for nuclear power plants 
grew owing to new job opportunities. Current report [12] 
shows that the nuclear industrial sector in France has created 
410,000 jobs in the country, and in the future (2009-2030), the 
sector would be able to create between 70,000 and 115,000 
additional jobs. In addition to EDF, AREVA and CEA have 
been major stakeholders in research, development, and 
innovation in nuclear energy technology in France. In 2012, 
CEA had a budget of € 4.7 billion with 10 research centers and 
bout 16,000 technicians, engineers and researchers [13]. 
 
Fig. 1. Electricity generation [TWh] by fuel type in France from 1945 to 
2012 (Source: [11][14][15]) 
 
Fig. 2. Electricity import, export, and national production (TWh) in France 
from 1945 to 2012 (Source: [11][14][15]) 
In addition to exporting the electricity, the extensive know-
how and expertise that had developed in France of building 
nuclear power systems was also brought in service to coutries. 
EDF began selling its products and expertise to countries in 
Africa and started a series of projects in China. 
B. Dynamics of Nuclear Energy System in France 
Based on the historical case of nuclear energy in France 
described above, we mapped the dynamics in a causal loop 
diagram using the seven functions of innovation (see Figure 3). 
 
Fig. 3. Development and Expansion of Nuclear Energy in France 
Figure 3 shows that the exogenous stimulus for change 
came with the oil crises. The shock to the domestic energy 
system catalyzed a policy response (F1), and the Messmer plan 
(of nuclear energy) sets the dynamics in motion. The policy 
mobilizes monetary and human resources (F6) to quickly 
establish a nuclear energy base. A number of power plant 
projects are started (F4) that quickly build up capacity, and any 
opposition is thwarted due to advocacy for national 
independence and energy self-reliance (F7). The early 
successes in stifling any opposition leads to sustained policy 
(F1) and the reinforcing loop – R1 takes hold. As the initial 
plants are brought to service and consumers are provided with 
electricity, a market is formed (F5) that further strengthens the 
advocacy power for the technology (F7). This dynamic is 
depicted by loop R3. Additionally, with continued state support 
(F1), the government-owned power utility engages in R&D (F2 
and F3) for advancing technology and expertise in nuclear 
power generation (shown in loop R2) that favorably helps in 
further expanding nuclear power capcity (F4) in the country. 
And with increasing number of power plants distributed 
throughout the country, a large number of jobs are created for 
those regions that strengthens public support and advocacy for 
the established system (F7) and puts pressure on the state to 
maintain the favorable and supportive policies for nuclear 
power (F1). 
In summary, a series of reinforcing (or virtuous) cycles 
come into play to enable a rapid and vast expansion of nuclear 
power plants in France. The rate of expansion of nuclear 
capacity however slowed over time as domestic demands were 
met with the installed base. The growth in nuclear power 
capacity was thus checked when market demand no longer 
justified new domestic installations, and a series of balancing 
cycles – that inhibit further growth and maintain a saturation 
level for the technology – came into action.  We limit our 
analysis in this paper up to the technology adoption stage, and 
in future work will describe the set of processes that led to 
saturation and growth inhibtion. 
IV. ELECTRIC VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT IN 
FRANCE 
An Electric Vehicle (EV) is a vehicle using only electric 
energy for its propulsion. EVs emerged in the late 19th century, 
but could not gain wide spread adoption as compared to 
internal combustion engine vehicles. In the following 
paragraphs, we give an overview of the history of the 
development of EVs in France, drawing mainly from the report 
presented in [16]. 
However, it is worth to say that the oil shock not only 
initiated significant transformation in power generation, but 
also stimulated changes in energy consumption trends in 
France (see figures 8, 9, 10 in the appendix). In 1973, 
transportation accounted for ~21% of crude oil consumption in 
the country [17]. Thus, in order to reduce the crude oil 
consumption by transport, in parallel with a massive and rapid 
electrification of railways, an Inter-Ministries Group for 
Electric Vehicles was set up in 1973 to coordinate development 
of EVs. Efforts for electrification of road vehicles, however, 
proceeded slowly due to lack of maturity in the technologies. 
The efforts continued, and by the 1980s, cooperative efforts 
grew to include major European operators (EDF -France, RWE 
-Germany and Electricity Council -England) to promote EVs. 
The national activities were connected with other European 
efforts such as the COST program that aimed to study the 
impact of EVs in the transportation systems and to identify 
gaps and R&D needs in the sector. In the 1990s, the French 
government created a new set of opportunities by providing 
policy and R&D support for advancing battery technologies 
and increasing the travel range of electric vehicles. A program 
of research and innovation on transport (PREDIT) was 
established to accelerate the introduction of new, energy 
efficient, and clean energy vehicles and transport systems. 
Many projects were launched to support the creation of new 
categories of users, incentivize acquisition, and to create 
enabling infrastructures. The objective was to initiate a large 
market by promoting acceptance by users and preparing the 
physical and organizational infrastructure. Several French 
regions participated in different programs for this purpose, and 
all major automakers proposed concept cars. In 1995, the 
government coordinated agreements with Peugeot, Renault and 
EDF, to organize development of necessary infrastructure. 
Overall, the results remained modest and wide spread adoption 
did not come about, largely due to high costs, technical 
performance, and other difficulties related to the absence of 
adequate infrastructure. The programs did, however, allow for 
large-scale demonstration tests that significantly helped in 
advancing the technological knowledge in the field and 
allowed manufacturers to gain a better understanding of driving 
habits and preferences of users in the country. 
In the last decade, a number of program and public 
initiatives – stemming from broader policies on climate change 
mitigation – were enacted that lent new support to EV 
development. The National Plan of Action against climate 
change and its operational implementation through the 
National Program to Improving Energy Efficiency were 
formulated in 2000. This was followed by the ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol in 2002. During this period, oil prices started to 
increase again after a long period of relatively low prices. In 
addition, in 2000, transportation accounted for ~64,7% of 
refined oil consumption in the country [17]. The high fuel costs 
created renewed interest and a new urgency for adopting 
electric vehicles. In 2003, Prime Minister Raffarin launched a 
plan for `Véhicule Propre et Econome` with a two-year budget 
of € 40 million for R&D aimed for large-scale industrial 
production of innovative, clean vehicles. In 2008, the `Grenelle 
de l`Environnement` Forum provided another injection of 
resources through the set up of a new financial fund for 
accelerating research and development of electric buses, heavy 
vehicles, and small urban vehicles. The government also 
committed €250 million in soft loans, by extending a subsidy 
of € 5,000 for purchasing electric vehicles and coordinating 
public purchase orders of electric vehicles [18]. A recent stated 
goal of the government is to bring together the resources of 
major French car manufacturers and several industry groups to 
meet the challenge of sustainable mobility in the country [19]. 
It also aims to help create jobs in the sector, with estimates 
ranging from 15,000 to 30,000 new jobs in electric cars, and 
electric and hybrid trucks production by 2030 [20]. 
A. Dynamics of Electric Vehicle Innovation 
We use the same methodological approach as we used for 
the nuclear energy case analysis, and draw from the historical 
narrative described above for EV development in France, to 
map the seven processes of innovation and their interactions in 
a causal loop diagram. 
The 1973 oil crisis served as the external stimulus for 
change in France, and the state undertook major policy 
initiatives for energy independence and energy security that 
included provisions for transforming the oil-dependent 
transportation sector in the country (F1). Resources were used 
(F6) for a rapid electrification of the railways (F4) and with 
energy independence as an important strategic goal there was 
strong support and advocacy for change (F7) that sustained 
policy action (F1). These dynamics formed loop R1 shown in 
the diagram in Figure 4. The government also created research 
programs to develop knowledge and technical know-how in 
electric road vehicles (F2), and these efforts were enhanced 
with wider cooperation with other European partners and major 
national actors in car manufacturing and energy production 
(F3). The knowledge generation and exchange efforts, 
however, continued to cycle through (loop R2) with increasing 
entrepreneurial activities (undertaken by Renault and EDF etc.) 
(F4), and advocacy for clean energy (F7) that maintained state 
support (F1) but did not lead to significant market creation. 
This dynamic is captured by loop R3. EV technology has so far 
not been able to move on to the last successful stages of 
innovation, i.e. of large-scale production and deployment 
(unlike the nuclear energy case) in France. The recent 
incentives and resources that have been mobilized by the 
government (in the form of subsidies and loans) (F6), however, 
may shift the dynamics where the resources allow for sufficient 
entrepreneurial development (F4) such that successful markets 
are created (F5). This will produce stronger advocacy (and 
counteraction to the resistance to change from the established 
regime of internal combustion engine vehicles) (F7) enabling 
and furthering state support (F1). Increasing entrepreneurial 
activities (F4) leading to market creation (F5) in turn will 
mobilize further resources in the private sector (F6) that creates 
loop R5. These dynamics of loops R4 and R5 may, thus set in 
motion strong positive reinforcing cycles that change the mix 
of ground transportation propulsion technology in the near 
future in France. 
 
Fig. 4. Current innovation processes in EVs Technology vs Potential future 
processes needed for large-scale deployment of EVs in France. 
In 2010, Renault, the automotive company estimated a 
global market share of 10% for EVs over the next ten years. It 
has commercially launched four types of EVs targeted for 
customers who do not drive long distances. This is applicable 
for the majority of drivers in Europe, where 87% of drivers 
travel less than 60 km daily [21]. Additionally, the power 
company, EDF, has announced that it will provide customers 
with electricity up to five times cheaper per kilometer traveled 
than gasoline or diesel [22]. Furthermore, there are now 
charging systems in shopping centers, parking, public 
buildings, etc. in the country. On the market side, 13,954 
individuals and light commercial electric vehicles were 
registered in France in 2013. Sales increased by nearly 50% 
compared to 9314 registrations recorded in 2012 [23][23]. 
Public orders were encouraged by the French Government, and 
for example, Renault will provide more than 10,000 EVs to the 
French mail company (La Poste) [23]. Furthermore, a number 
of partnerships are being established between automakers, 
electricity utilities and parking companies [22][23] etc. Figure 
5 shows the market share and number of registered individual 
EVs in France. 
 
Fig. 5. Number of registered new individual electric vehicles and market 
share in France (Source [16][17][24]). 
For the first generation of EVs (with low production 
volumes), the acquisition price would be higher than for an 
internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicle of the same category 
due mainly to the battery price. However, the total cost of 
ownership would be less expensive mainly due to the price of 
electric energy and cheap maintenance as shown in Figure 6. 
Indeed, despite a relatively high taxation of electricity in 
France, the prices are relatively cheap compared to the rest of 
Europe due to its large development of nuclear and 
hydropower (see Figure 7.) 
 
Fig. 6.  Total cost of ownership - Difference between EV and ICEV [21] 
 
Fig. 7. Electricity prices between 2009 to 2011: France vs Europe (euro/kwh) 
(Source [25][23]) 
The new complex economic equation and business model 
related to EVs could evolve in the future given the potential of 
their introduction in the market. The economy of scale and the 
evolution of technology could impact the evolution of these 
costs in the future. The business models become more complex 
given that the prices of energy may drastically change during 
the day, and that some value is attached to the ability to level 
energy demands on the energy network (see for example [26] 
about “Vehicle to grid” interactions). That would increase the 
electricity and transportation nexus.  
In an interesting parallel with the nuclear energy case, we 
also find that technology diffusion of electric vehicles is also 
crossing international boundaries. The Reanult-Nissan Alliance 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2010, for 
the promotion and deployment of EVs in Ankara, Turkey. 
Another MoU has been signed with the Municipality of the 
City of Córdoba in Argentina, etc. 
V. DISCUSSION  
The historical development of nuclear energy in France and 
its comparison with the now evolving transition in 
transportation offers an interesting case for studying 
technological change. We find in the case of nuclear energy, 
that the observation made by Arthur in [8] is pertinent that 
“under increasing returns, competition between objects - in this 
case technologies - takes on an evolutionary character, with a 
'founder effect' mechanism akin to that in genetics. 'History' 
becomes important.” He notes that the dynamical processes 
that select winners from a pool of competing technologies are 
impossible to predict due to interactions of economic forces 
and random historical events. 
The two cases that are discussed here are linked at the 
outset in history through dependence on oil and policy action 
that stemmed from the oil crises of 1973. We find that the 
adoption rate of the two technologies, however, was very 
different. Nuclear energy was quickly and decisively deployed 
at a large-scale in the country, whereas EVs did not have the 
same wide spread diffusion (expect in niche areas). 
Investigating the factors that led to these different outcomes 
can provide useful lessons. 
One possible explanation maybe that at the time of the 
crisis (that created a window of opportunity for enacting 
change), nuclear power generation technology had matured to a 
level such that it already occupied a small niche market in the 
power sector (of 8%) in France. The technical knowledge, as 
well as state enterprise (through EDF) already existed that 
could quickly and decisively shift the system at a large scale. 
This fits within the proposed theory offered in [9] that suggests 
that a technological subsitution occurs if at the time of sudden 
disruptions (such as shocks, crises) there is a niche technology 
that occupies a share of 5% or more in the market. The niche 
technology can then quickly diffuse and replace the incumbent 
technology. In the case of EVs, while railways could quickly 
change due to sufficient technology maturity, the technology 
for other modes of ground transportation (buses and cars) was 
not sufficiently developed to allow for quick large-scale 
substitution. The impetus for large-scale change waned with 
time as the shock of the crisis wore off, and EV innovation was 
stuck in the knowledge creation, exchange, and limited 
entrepreneurial activities loop. State support remained – but its 
magnitude fluctuated over the decades with the long-term 
trends of the price of oil. The awareness of global warming and 
large increases in price of oil a few years ago have brought 
renewed support for deploying EVs – but that support has not 
matched the urgency and strength of impulse for change as was 
brought about in 1973 with the oil crisis. 
In the two cases, it is interesting to note the significant role 
of policy in initiating and shaping the outcome of the two 
technologies. In France, the government not only formulated 
policy, but also operationalized it through state-owned 
techincal enterprises. The roles of EDF and Renault (partly 
owned by the government) are prominent in advancing the 
innovations and deployment. Additionally, a number of state-
owned research labs and organizations (such as CEA) worked 
under the central policies that brought about change in the 
power sector and are now increasingly influencing the 
transportation sector. As a number of countries seek to escape 
the ‘carbon lock-in’, these cases offer a perspective on the role 
of long-term policy in building new industrial paradigms. 
In analyzing the two cases, it is also interesting to note the 
critical issue of electricity costs that are likely to play an 
important role in adoption of electric cars in the country. With 
EDF providing electricity for charging EVs, the total cost of 
ownership of EVs becomes attractive to customers in France. 
The large nuclear power base that allows for cheap and 
abundant electricity suppplies in France, puts EVs in a much 
more advantageous position (especially if oil prices remain 
relatively high) as compared to many other countries in the 
world. The legacy of nuclear power is thus likely going to play 
an influential role in the future success of EVs in the country. 
Based on the discussion presented above, we postulate the 
notion of cross-sector path dependence due to inter-
connections between traditionally different technology 
domains. Path dependence refers to the pattern of behavior of a 
system in which initial conditions and unpredictable events in 
the early stages, decisively determine its ultimate fate [6]. 
Initially, a number of outcomes are equally possible, but 
random events shift the trajectory in a particular direction and a 
series of positive reinforcing loops lock the system into a 
particular course from which it cannot turn back. There is a 
vast amount of literature on this behavior of complex, socio-
technical systems, with often cited examples ranging from the 
QWERTY keyboard layout [8] to gauge of railroads in the US 
[6]. We extend this idea, and note that as new technologies are 
creating inter-linkages across traditionally separate domains, it 
is likely that incumbent technologies in one sector (that became 
entrenched through path dependence) will shape future 
trajectories of technology in other sectors. In other words, 
historical chance events bring about lock-in of a particular 
technology in a sector, which in turn influences the trajectory 
of technologies in other inter-connected sectors. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we map the historical development of nuclear 
power systems and electric vehciles in France. We develop a 
qualitative analytical approach by employing concepts from 
literature on innovation, technology adoption, and 
technological change, and map the virtuous cycles of growth 
using a set of seven process of technology innovation. This 
work is a departure from the linear models of innovation, and 
attempts to identify the interactions of processes of innovation 
that led to different outcomes for adoption of nuclear energy 
and EVs in France. Unlike the disconnected system of 
innovation described by Vannevar Bush (where he suggested 
that the government should contribute in basic research and the 
industry will apply it to practical problems [27]), in the two 
cases we presented in this paper, we describe iterative and 
incremental cyclic loops to represent the process of innovation. 
We also discuss the notion of cross-sector path dependence that 
may grow in importance as system inter-linkages increase [28]. 
An improved understanding of this behavior maybe necessary 
to predict diffusion of new technologies. 
We will expand this work in the future to include the 
important consideration of economic aspects. We have not 
evaluted the optimality of the policies and processes for the 
French economy in this paper – that was outside the scope of 
this study. We only attempted to systematically map the forces 
and processes that have shaped the trajectory of the two 
technologies. In future work, we will investigate the critical 
issues of costs and financial resources provided by the state to 
initiate and sustain the development and deployment of these 
technologies. Furthermore, we will apply our method to study 
the case of EV development in Japan (given the impacts of 
Fukushima), and the US (considering the shale gas context) in 
order to make comparative assessments. Also, it will be 
interesting to study the ongoing energy transition in Germany 
where policy makers have proposed a complete phase out of 
nuclear energy by 2022 [29]. Using the different cases, we will 
attempt to draw out general archtypes of interactions of the 
process of innovation in order to elicit lessons for policy and 
strategy for technology development and diffusion. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Fig. 8. Primary energy consumption by source in toe (tonne of oil equivalent) 
(source [17]) 
 
 
Fig. 9. Final energy consumption by sector in toe (tonne of oil equivalent) 
(source [17]) 
 
 
Fig. 10. Final energy consumption of refined oil by sector (in thousand tonne) (source [17]) 
 
 
